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Abstract
There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics matters. However, there is
little scholarly convergence on what politics is or rigorous theorization and empirical testing of how politics matters. Many
enforcement and compliance studies omit political variables altogether. Among those that address political inﬂuences on regulatory outcomes, politics has been deﬁned in myriad ways and, too often, left undeﬁned. Even when political constructs are
explicitly operationalized, the mechanisms by which they inﬂuence regulatory outcomes are thinly hypothesized or simply
ignored. If politics is truly as important to enforcement and compliance outcomes as everyone in the ﬁeld seems to agree, regulatory scholarship must make a more sustained and systematic effort to understand their relationship, because overlooking
this connection risks missing what is actually driving regulatory outcomes. This article examines how the construct of “politics” has been conceptualized in regulatory theory and analyzes how it has been operationalized in empirical studies of regulatory enforcement and compliance outcomes. It brings together scholarship across disciplines that rarely speak but have much
to say to one another on this subject in order to constitute a ﬁeld around the politics of regulation. The goal is to sharpen theoretical and empirical understandings of when and how regulation works by better accounting for the role politics plays in its
enforcement.
Keywords: compliance, enforcement, politics, regulation.

1. Introduction
There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that “politics matters”
(Haines 2011, p. 229). Hawkins (1984, p. 9) introduces his foundational study of UK environmental inspectors
by observing that “regulatory agencies must operate in a political environment, for regulation is intended to preserve the sometimes fragile balance between the interests of economic activity on the one hand and the public
welfare on the other. Agencies are extremely sensitive to their political environment.” Kagan (1994, p. 399), elaborating the range of conditions that explain variation in enforcement styles, stresses: “Regulation is a political
process. It emerges from political demands and political struggles, and is shaped by competing political ideas and
theories.”
Despite near universal acknowledgment of the important role politics plays in regulatory compliance and enforcement, there is little scholarly convergence on what politics is or comprehensive theorization of how it matters in producing compliance and enforcement outcomes. Many empirical studies of compliance and enforcement – notably
game-theoretic accounts (e.g. Scholz 1984; Ayres & Braithwaite 1992) – omit political variables altogether. Among
those that address political inﬂuences on regulatory outcomes, politics has been deﬁned in myriad ways and, too
often, left undeﬁned. Even when political constructs are explicitly operationalized, the mechanisms by which they
inﬂuence regulatory outcomes are thinly hypothesized or simply ignored. For instance, many studies demonstrate
an association between the party afﬁliation of political principals and the enforcement activities of regulators
(e.g. Moe 1982, 1985; Scholz & Wei 1986; Hutter 1989; Scholz et al. 1991; Carpenter 2002; Shrock 2013; Almond &
Esbester 2018), but few have identiﬁed the causal pathways through which political inﬂuence operates (Carpenter
1996; Innes & Mitra 2015). If politics truly is as important to enforcement and compliance outcomes as everyone
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in the ﬁeld seems to agree, regulatory scholarship must make a more sustained and systematic effort to understand
their relationship.
Such an effort is vital in the current political context. A generation of deregulation, neoliberal regulatory
reform, anti-statist political rhetoric, and expanding executive control over regulators in the US and other
wealthy, Western democracies has left many agencies resource-starved, captured by regulated industry, and managed by political cronies. The reality of increasingly weak and politicized bureaucracies calls into question the
Weberian assumptions of “meritocracy, political insulation, and rationality” (Amengual 2016, p. 5) underlying
much regulation and governance scholarship, and the accompanying expectation that variations in regulatory
outcomes are determined largely by the quality and technocratic characteristics of the bureaucracy. This calls for
a better understanding of how political conditions shape these qualities and characteristics and moderate their
effects on compliance and enforcement.
This kind of project is already underway in some pockets of the regulation and governance ﬁeld. Many
scholars of regulation in the global South are engaged in a collective effort to document political inﬂuences on
regulatory compliance and enforcement. For instance, clusters of studies on environmental law enforcement in
China (e.g. Lo et al. 2006; Tilt 2007; Van Rooij 2010; Van Rooij et al. 2013) and labor law enforcement in South
America (e.g. McAllister 2008, 2010; Coslovsky & Locke 2013; Amengual 2014, 2016) focus on the political conditions that enable and constrain regulators’ enforcement practices and ﬁrms’ compliance practices. As Amengual
(2016, p. 28) explains, attention to politics is essential to understanding regulatory outcomes in “places with
ﬂawed bureaucracies.” As it becomes increasingly apparent that “ﬂawed bureaucracies” are the norm rather than
the exception around the globe, this article seeks to constitute a ﬁeld around the politics of regulatory compliance
and enforcement. This project is not meant to suggest that regulation and governance should be seen as nothing
more than politics, nor is it meant to impugn the technocratic bent of empirical regulation and governance scholarship. On the contrary, it seeks to sharpen empirical understandings about when and how regulation works by
considering how better to account for the role politics plays in it.
The effort to better account for political inﬂuences on compliance and enforcement outcomes is critical to
understanding empirically what actually drives these outcomes. Well-established empirical propositions arising
out of regulation and governance scholarship seldom are qualiﬁed based on variations in political conditions.
This oversight risks compromising the validity of these empirical claims. Take, for instance, the concept of the
“deterrence trap,” or the ceiling on punitive measures regulators may take against regulated entities. The “deterrence trap” long has been claimed to constrain regulators’ ability to deter corporate misconduct with large ﬁnes,
because it is assumed to be politically unacceptable to drive a company out of business (Mendeloff 1979; Coffee
Jr 1981; Sunstein 1990; Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). This empirical claim typically is stated without qualiﬁcation
regarding political context. While the claim recognizes that regulation occurs against a political backdrop, it
assumes that the backdrop is constant – or at least that it does not vary in interesting or important ways. Such
empirical claims do not interrogate the nature of political acceptability, how political acceptability varies across
contexts, through what mechanisms political acceptability might be communicated to regulators, and how those
variations might alter the nature of the empirical constraint.
These blind spots are problematic, because the conditions of political acceptability can vary quite dramatically. Chinese Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPB), for instance, do not appear to be constrained by the
“deterrence trap” that ensnares US regulators. EPBs have long exercised their power forcibly to close recalcitrant
polluting factories (Van Rooij et al. 2018). In 2017, Chinese regulators effectively shut down over 35,000 factories
by sealing them, seizing them, or suspending production (Van Rooij et al. 2018). Variations in the political context of regulatory compliance and enforcement are not always so extreme, and they occur not only between countries but within domestic regulatory regimes. For instance, it has been observed that a cooperative style of
regulatory enforcement may yield very different compliance outcomes depending on the political climate in
which it is deployed (McAllister 2010; Short 2013). These examples suggest the need to be more attentive to political context in generating empirical knowledge and making empirical claims about regulatory compliance and
enforcement.
The effort to better understand political inﬂuences on compliance and enforcement is likewise vital to the
project of effective regulatory reform and advocacy. Proponents of regulation focused on the technical details of
regulatory design may lose sight of the political contingencies upon which regulatory projects succeed or fail. It is
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important to highlight the ways in which effective (and ineffective) regulation is a political as well as a technical
project.
Politics permeates every phase of the regulatory process. This article focuses on the implementation phase:
speciﬁcally, enforcement of and compliance with regulation. While this phase of the regulatory process is the central concern of much regulation and governance scholarship, it has been comparatively neglected in the existing
literature on the politics of regulation. Much more attention has been paid to the role of politics in agenda setting
(e.g. McCombs & Shaw 1972; Birkland 2017), rulemaking (e.g. Weingast & Moran 1983; Quinn & Shapiro 1991),
policy adoption (Wilson 1980), policy diffusion (e.g. Pistor 2000; Berkowitz et al. 2003; Halliday & Carruthers
2007; Linos 2011), and institutional design (e.g. Wilson 1980; Stephenson 2008; Mattli & Woods 2009; Levi-Faur
2011; Farhang & Yaver 2016). This is, perhaps, because the Weberian assumptions of the ﬁeld attach more
strongly to the implementation of law by ostensibly autonomous bureaucracies than to the enactment of legislation or the adoption of administrative policy. Thus, the article’s focus on regulatory compliance and enforcement
extends the broader literature on the politics of regulation.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the role politics plays in prominent theories of regulation
and assesses whether these theories clearly articulate what counts as politics and offer testable hypotheses about
relationships between politics and regulatory outcomes. It argues that while there is a long tradition in the ﬁeld
of theorizing the importance of politics, no clear roadmap has emerged to guide empirical investigation of the
relationship between politics and regulatory compliance and enforcement outcomes. Section 3 documents
attempts to operationalize political constructs in both qualitative and quantitative empirical studies and identiﬁes
areas of convergence and divergence between the two. Section 4 analyzes the contributions and limitations of
these studies to advancing empirical understanding of the relationship between politics and regulatory outcomes.
Section 5 discusses how these insights can inform efforts to develop more sophisticated understandings about the
politics of regulation.

2. Politics in regulatory theory
This section reviews how politics has been conceptualized in prominent theories of regulation, including: the economic
theory, political science theories, compliance theories, constitutive theories, organizational theories, and critical theory.
It analyzes the role of politics in regulation as posited by each of these theories, discusses how each theory deﬁnes the
set of relevant political constructs, and assesses the guidance these theories provide to empirical researchers.
2.1. The economic theory
The economic theory of regulation (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976) profoundly shaped conceptions and assumptions about the role of politics in regulation by specifying categories of political variables that explain regulatory
outcomes and by articulating empirically testable propositions. The economic theory analyzes regulatory behavior
and outcomes through the lens of basic economic axioms about supply and demand. Regulation is conceptualized
as a commodity that is supplied by regulators and consumed by the public, regulated industries, and other interest groups. Politicians are presumed to be self-interested maximizers of political support in the form of votes or
the money necessary to get votes. Interest groups can buy the regulatory outcomes they prefer by providing
ﬁnancial or other political support to politicians or regulators. The interest groups that supply the most support
to politicians or regulators reap the greatest regulatory beneﬁts. Drawing on theories of collective action, the economic theory of regulation posits that an interest group’s ability to deliver political support – and thus its ability
to obtain desired regulatory outcomes – depends on its resources and its ability to organize and mobilize its
members. Its ability to mobilize depends, in turn, on the ﬁnancial stakes of regulation, including how much
group members stand to gain or lose from a proposed regulatory action and how costly it would be to mobilize.
Because these barriers to collective action tend to advantage industry groups, Stigler (1971, p. 3) famously opined
that “regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its beneﬁt.”
This particular insight animates capture theory, perhaps the most inﬂuential iteration of the economic theory
of regulation (Carpenter & Moss 2014). While the roots of capture theory predate the economic theory of regulation (Bernstein 1955), the economic theory formalized and popularized “the notion that regulatory agencies are
© 2019 The Author. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
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captured by producers” (Peltzman 1989, p. 38). Over time, capture theory has shed many of the economic
theory’s animating concerns and limiting principles, and has come to stand in for “the essential idea that
policymakers are for sale, and that regulatory policy is largely purchased by those most interested and able to buy
it” (Carpenter & Moss 2014, p. 9). Unlike the economic theory, which was grounded in empirical scholarship
and was developed to explain variations in regulatory outcomes that could not be explained by earlier “public
interest” theories of regulation (Peltzman 1989), capture theory is not grounded in empirical evidence, nor does
it seek to reconcile variations in empirical outcomes (Carpenter & Moss 2014). Indeed, capture’s main weakness
as a theory of political inﬂuence on regulation is that it provides no basis for theorizing variations in regulatory
outcomes. Rather, it describes a presumably uniform departure from some un-operationalized ideal. Thus, it cannot generate empirically testable propositions.
The economic theory of regulation originally was developed to explain a narrow set of regulatory outcomes:
why regulation is enacted, how the beneﬁts and burdens of regulation are distributed among different groups,
and whether those distributions are efﬁcient. Subsequent scholarship extended the economic theory to questions
about regulatory enforcement and compliance outcomes – for instance, the conditions under which regulatory
enforcement is likely to be stricter or more lenient (e.g. Earnhart 2004). In this context, the economic theory predicts that support for regulatory enforcement increases as the net beneﬁts of regulation rise and that opposition
to regulatory enforcement increases with the net costs imposed by regulation. The key explanatory variables in
these analyses measure how much different groups stand to gain or lose from different enforcement levels and
their capacity to politically mobilize and insist on their preferences.

2.2. Political science theories
As originally conceptualized, the economic theory of regulation directly addressed only the behavior of elected
legislators and not regulators, who are unelected and thus do not directly consume votes or ﬁnancial support in
the form of campaign contributions. The theory operated on the simplifying assumption “that regulators do the
bidding of a representative politician who has the ultimate power” (Peltzman 1989, p. 6) to make decisions about
regulation. Subsequent political science research complicated this assumption and ﬁlled in some of the institutional gaps in the economic theory while retaining the theory’s basic insights about the relevant political actors
and their behavioral motivations.
For political scientists, political control – the extent to which elected political principals inﬂuence the decisions of their unelected agents in the bureaucracy – became the paramount theoretical and empirical concern.
The issue of political control ﬂows from an institutionally informed understanding of the economic theory: speciﬁcally, that in order to reap the electoral rewards posited by the economic theory, political ofﬁcials must control
the regulators charged with enforcing legislatively enacted policies (McCubbins et al. 1987). Politicians are theorized to exercise control over regulators through direct oversight mechanisms like monitoring, rewarding, and
punishing regulators for their policy decisions, and through administrative procedures imposed on the agency ex
ante to channel administrative decisionmaking toward politicians’ desired policy outcomes (McCubbins et al.
1987). Political scientists identiﬁed multiple pathways through which politicians and politically inﬂuential groups
might inﬂuence regulators, observing that “public agencies are anchored in networks of relationships with executives, legislative committees, and constituency groups, and that their behavior is shaped as well by their economic
environments, the courts, and a range of internal organizational factors” (Moe 1985, p. 1095). Political control
theory thus provides a stable of testable propositions about the political avenues through which regulators’
enforcement decisions might be affected. However, with few exceptions (Wood 1988), political control theory has
been used to explain policy formation outcomes rather than agency enforcement practices, and it has been criticized for its lack of explanatory power (Wood 1988; Jones 2003; Huber 2007).
More recently, political scientists have looked to agency reputation to explain regulatory outcomes. An
agency’s reputation is a function of both perceptions about its efﬁcacy in achieving policy goals and the nature of
the networked coalition that supports the agency’s programs (Carpenter 2001). In this way, it synthesizes political
control theory with insights about interest groups from the economic theory of regulation and moves beyond
both to suggest that both political control and interest group inﬂuence on regulation are mediated by regulators’
technical efﬁcacy and their skill at communicating regulatory successes and building supportive coalitions.
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Reputation theory was developed to explain why some regulators enjoy more power and greater autonomy from
political principals than others, as evidenced by their ability to get their preferred legislative policies enacted over
the ostensible objections of political representatives (Carpenter 2001). But it also has been used to explain
enforcement outcomes (Gilad & Yogev 2012; Etienne 2015). For instance, Carpenter (2010) theorizes that
reputation-based concerns shaped the US Food and Drug Administration’s allocation of resources for drug
approvals and its efforts to insulate scientiﬁc functions from special interest group inﬂuence.

2.3. Compliance theories
Partly in response to the stylized claims of the economic theory of regulation and deterrence theory, compliance
theories developed from observation of on-the-ground enforcement and compliance practices (e.g. Bardach &
Kagan 1982; Hawkins 1984; Hutter 1989). These studies mapped the enforcement practices of regulators and
investigated the efﬁcacy of different approaches to implementing regulation. Although compliance theories do not
explicitly hypothesize political variables or articulate a general theory of politics, politics played a crucial framing
function in this domain. Going by the Book (Bardach & Kagan 1982), for instance, was motivated by a sense that
the economic theory of regulation did not sufﬁciently account for the political inﬂuence of non-industry public
interest groups on regulatory enforcement practices. Bardach and Kagan (1982) argued that the political demands
of anti-business interest groups and the media’s sensationalistic coverage of environmental and safety catastrophes
prompted regulators not to favor industry, as the economic theory would predict, but rather to be overly harsh
and punitive toward industry. They argued further that this punitive approach to enforcement undermined industry compliance with regulations because it fomented resentment on the part of regulated entities. Based on qualitative observations of regulatory interactions and interviews with regulators and regulated entities, compliance
studies theorized that cooperative or facilitative regulatory strategies could produce better compliance outcomes
than highly punitive regulatory strategies (Bardach & Kagan 1982; Kagan & Scholz 1984; Hawkins 1984).
Early qualitative studies in this domain focused on the micro-interactions of regulators and regulated entities –
in some cases drilling all the way down to details like the compliance-related impacts of safety inspectors’ wardrobe
choices, dialect, and ability to project personal conﬁdence (Hawkins 1984). Still, this literature was attuned to the
ways in which the broader political context shaped the enforcement approaches adopted by regulators, including
agency resource levels (Hutter 1989); public consensus about the moral blameworthiness of regulatory infractions
(Hawkins 1984; Hutter 1989); the public’s anti-regulatory mood (Hutter & Manning 1990); media portrayals of regulation and regulators (Hutter & Manning 1990); intra-governmental threats to the agency’s turf (Hutter 1989); the
political afﬁliation of local regulated populations and politicians (Hutter 1989); and prominent scholarly advocacy
of deregulation (Hutter & Manning 1990). Kagan (1994) theorized that political variables collected from these and
other studies constitute a “political environment” that inﬂuences the enforcement style of regulators. While these
early compliance studies revealed valuable insights into political inﬂuences on regulatory enforcement practices,
these insights tended to be ad hoc observations from the ﬁeld that were not systematically theorized, and Kagan’s
(1994) attempt to synthesize them does not seem to have gained signiﬁcant traction in subsequent research.
Indeed, the political dimension of compliance theory receded precipitously as the compliance literature’s
insights about cooperation between regulators and regulated entities were formally modeled as a repeated
enforcement game (Scholz 1984) in which both players select strategies to maximize their respective payoffs in
anticipation of and in response to the strategies deployed by the opposing player. Inspired by Axelrod’s (1984)
path-breaking, game-theoretic model in The Evolution of Cooperation, Scholz (1984) demonstrated that a “tit-fortat” strategy in which the regulator leads with cooperation and continues to cooperate until the regulated entity
defects is likely to maximize payoffs for both players. While game-theoretic accounts of compliance and enforcement acknowledged the existence of political inﬂuences on agencies, these inﬂuences were explicitly excluded
from the formal model, which “relegate[s] all political … activities of ﬁrms, agencies, and other actors (including
groups beneﬁting from the policy) to the same exogenous environmental status” (Scholz 1984, p. 193).
The game-theoretic model of compliance and enforcement was popularized by Responsive Regulation
(Ayres & Braithwaite 1992) and continues to dominate regulatory scholarship and the practical discourse of regulators (Mascini 2013). While Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) saw responsive regulation as an overtly political project – both a strategy for resolving intractable political battles between advocates and opponents of deregulation
© 2019 The Author. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
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and a theoretical paradigm for investigating relations between state, market, and civil society – the responsive regulation model has become largely unmoored from these foundations (Mascini 2013; Parker 2013).
The most sustained theorization of political inﬂuences on enforcement in Responsive Regulation comes in its
discussion of tripartism. Drawing on capture theory, the authors observe that while cooperation between regulators and regulated entities may promote compliance under certain conditions, “cooperation may also allow agencies to abdicate their public-regarding responsibilities to the interests of the very ﬁrms they are regulating”
(Ayres & Braithwaite 1992, p. 449). They theorize that regulatory capture could be mitigated through institutional
design that empowers public interest groups to act as full participants in the regulatory process to balance the
inﬂuence of regulated entities. Tripartism has provided a useful theoretical framework for empirical work investigating how private, third-party monitors shape regulatory enforcement and compliance outcomes.
Subsequent theoretical elaborations of responsive regulation have suggested that effective regulators must be
responsive not only to regulated entities’ compliance performance and attitudes, but also to the broader institutional environment in which they are operating, including the constraints and opportunities presented by political
conditions (Baldwin & Black 2008, 2010). But these theories do not fully ﬂesh out the relevant political conditions
or the mechanisms by which they operate. Rather, they suggest the need for broader engagement with other disciplines to better understand “the exact nature and role of the institutional environment in shaping individual and
organizational decisions” (Baldwin & Black 2008, p. 71). Related theories – including ﬂexible regulation, reﬂexive
regulation, smart regulation, and new governance – likewise have failed to ﬁll this gap and have been criticized
for “attend[ing] to regulatory technique without always giving adequate attention to the political context within
which that technique operates” (Ford 2017, p. 122).

2.4. Constitutive theories
Politics has played a central role in critical theories of risk regulation and other theories in which it is seen as
constituting (as opposed to causing) regulatory inputs and outcomes. Risk-based regulation seeks to anticipate
and reduce harms arising out of social and economic activities (Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock 2013) by identifying relevant risks and targeting regulatory resources to mitigate them based on an assessment of the likelihood and magnitude of harm posed by speciﬁc persons, ﬁrms, or activities (Hood et al. 2001; Baldwin & Black 2008).
Employing quantitative risk-management techniques, risk-based regulation holds out the promise of technical
and seemingly objective responses to social and economic risks (Black 2005; Almond & Esbester 2018). However,
critical theories of risk regulation have long recognized that conceptions of risk are not purely technical and
always entail “difﬁcult political and ethical decisions about priorities and balance rather than absolute choices”
(Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock 2013, p. 385). Regulatory decisions about risk also implicate the political legitimacy of
the social and economic systems that produce risks as well as politicians and regulators who tolerate certain risks
while targeting others (Baldwin & Black 2008; Haines 2011).
Haines (2011) theorizes that political contestation over risk shapes regulatory outcomes through the “paradox
of regulation.” On the one hand, the public strenuously demands regulation for protection from the risks of living
in an advanced technological society, whereas on the other hand, regulation is maligned for threatening individual liberty. Because regulation is an artifact of this ideological conﬂict, it inevitably embodies incompatible objectives. The presence of incompatible objectives in regulation, in turn, fosters ongoing political contestation over
implementation and enforcement, with “different sections of society each vying for their values and interests to
be evident in the eventual regime” (Haines 2011, p. 28).
Extending Haines’ focus on contestation over regulation at the societal level, another body of research highlights the micro-level contestation that occurs within regulated organizations and between regulators and regulated individuals. Coslovsky et al. (2011, p. 325) critique the regulation literature for its narrow conception of
politics as “the enabling or constraining environment in which inspectors and their counterparts work.” They
suggest, instead, a conceptualization of politics that encompasses micro-interactions among individuals through
which “different actors construct and reformulate their alliances, preferences, and willingness to comply”
(Coslovsky et al. 2011, p. 326). They call this the “sub-politics of regulation” and argue that research must attend
to the regulatory contestation that occurs outside of ofﬁcial institutions and state politics (Coslovsky et al. 2011,
p. 326). Studies adopting this approach investigate how day-to-day negotiations over regulatory enforcement
6
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constitute what it means to comply with and enforce the law (Coslovsky 2009; Coslovsky et al. 2011; Haines
2011; Huising & Silbey 2011; Pires 2011).
The “sub-politics” studies are part of a larger body of organizational scholarship that reveals how the “ofﬁce
politics” that occur within organizations in response to regulatory demands shape compliance and enforcement
outcomes. These drivers include the internal operational structure and normative environment of organizations
(Selznick 1969; Stone 1975; Vaughn 1983; Bird et al. 2019); the professional and managerial framing of legal obligations (Edelman et al. 2001; Short 2006); the construction and operation of private dispute resolution forums
(Edelman 1992; Edelman et al. 1993; Edelman et al. 1999; Talesh 2015); and, more broadly, micro-level negotiation and compromise among various internal organizational constituencies (Edelman et al. 1991; Silbey 2011;
Gray & Silbey 2014; Almond & Gray 2017). A related body of literature addresses how compliance and enforcement outcomes are shaped by professionals subject to a complex set of cross-cutting incentives, demands, and
political pressures (Edelman et al. 1991; Edelman et al. 1992). These studies reveal layers of power and contestation operating beyond formal political institutions to inﬂuence regulatory outcomes. However, with few exceptions outside the “sub-politics” literature (Edelman et al. 1991), studies in these domains do not characterize
organizational or professional practices as “political.” Moreover, these studies rarely address the relationship
between internal organizational responses to regulation and the external political environment.

2.5. Critical theory
Apart from its own treatment of politics, regulation and governance scholarship has been subjected to withering
political critique for serving the neoliberal agenda of deregulation and “regulation at a distance” (Pearce & Tombs
1990; Tombs 2015). The deepest and most persistent critique has been that research on compliance and enforcement is ideologically determined because it assumes “the legitimacy of a capitalist economic system and the illegitimacy of its being policed” (Pearce & Tombs 1990, p. 429 (emphasis in original)). While this perspective throws
into sharp relief the political stakes of regulation, it is based on a totalizing account in which regulatory outcomes
are structurally determined by the political economy of capitalism, thus it provides no insight into how variations
in political conditions might produce different regulatory outcomes.
Taken together, regulatory theories provide many useful perspectives on the signiﬁcance of politics in
shaping regulatory outcomes. However, it is difﬁcult to discern a clear roadmap for empirical research from
this literature. First, perhaps because politics is not the primary concern of most regulatory theory, the
boundaries of the concept are ill deﬁned. One can discern in the literature conceptions of politics ranging
from “the art or science of government … or inﬂuencing governmental policy” (Politics 2019) to “the total
complex of relations between people living in society” (Politics 2019). Regulatory theory has not explicitly
undertaken to specify the nature and scope of politics or to explore the stakes of different boundary conditions. Nor has regulatory theory addressed whether the deﬁnition of politics should include different things in
different regulatory contexts.
Second, there has been little attempt to synthesize theories or to bridge the macro- and micro- levels at which
different theories operate. These theories exist largely in reaction to or in isolation from one another. For
instance, the micro-level “sub-politics” perspective positions itself as a corrective to the economic theory – particularly its account of interest groups and preference formation – but it is not clear whether sub-politics rejects the
economic theory wholesale or seeks to supplement or revise it. If the latter, there is no indication which insights
from the economic theory should be retained and which should be discarded. Broadly speaking, micro-level theories do not reject or refute the inﬂuence of macro-level factors, but the relationship between the two is unclear.
Macro-level theories typically ignore micro-level factors altogether. Reputational theory is a notable exception,
locating political inﬂuence on regulation at the intersection of individual perceptions of agency capacity and institutional networks of support for agencies.
The general lack of theoretical integration has left empirical researchers with a grab bag of political variables
and possible mechanisms to explore while providing little clear direction as to which political variables should be
investigated, under which conditions, and which questions these variables can answer. The next section examines
how empirical studies have handled the challenge of conceptualizing and measuring political inﬂuences on regulatory compliance and enforcement.
© 2019 The Author. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
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3. Operationalizing politics in empirical research on compliance and enforcement
Empirically investigating a concept as capacious and contested as politics presents signiﬁcant challenges, so there
is much to be learned from studies that have attempted to operationalize politics and assess its inﬂuence on regulatory compliance and enforcement. Operationalizing politics for purposes of empirical study requires researchers
to deﬁne politics as a construct and select appropriate measures for that construct. This section reviews how qualitative and quantitative researchers have approached these tasks and discuss the contributions and limitations of
their efforts. The studies are organized by their methodological approach to highlight key areas of convergence
and divergence in the way these two bodies of research conceptualize and measure political constructs. The focus
of this article is on how studies have operationalized politics rather than the substantive ﬁndings yielded by political variables. This emphasis is maintained, in part, to cabin the current project within reasonable boundaries. It
also arises from a conviction that moving this literature forward requires ongoing synthesis of the studies’ substantive ﬁndings that is grounded in speciﬁc empirical contexts.
3.1. Methodology
The studies reviewed in this section share three common characteristics: (1) they are empirical (as distinct from
purely theoretical, modeling, or review articles); (2) they seek to explain regulatory enforcement and compliance
outcomes (as distinct from rules or other policy outputs); and (3) they explicitly theorize political variables as an
explanation for these outcomes (rather than merely including political variables as controls).1 These criteria are
designed to identify a discrete and reasonably comparable set of studies that explicitly address the core question
of this article: how to operationalize political inﬂuences on regulatory compliance and enforcement outcomes.
Studies were selected for inclusion through a snowball sampling technique, starting with those that I knew,
searching for back- and forward-citations of these studies, and doing the same with the useful studies identiﬁed
through each round of searches. I consulted colleagues with expertise in ﬁelds outside my own to request additional recommendations, and I am indebted to reviewers for their further suggestions. This methodology does
not yield a representative sample or an exhaustive catalog of every study that meets my selection criteria
(although I know of none more comprehensive). Thus, I do not purport to make deﬁnitive empirical claims
about the literature. Rather, my intention is to start a cross-disciplinary conversation about the contours of a ﬁeld
investigating the politics of regulatory compliance and enforcement. To the extent that my initial attempt inspires
readers to identify gaps in coverage or to quarrel with categorizations, I will consider the project a success.
The next two sections discuss my ﬁndings. Detailed tables cataloging all the empirical studies reviewed and
my coding of their political constructs can be found in Appendix A (qualitative studies) and Appendix B (quantitative studies). Table 1, below, summarizes where qualitative and quantitative researchers converge and diverge in
their use of political constructs.
3.2. Construct convergence
Broadly speaking, quantitative studies in the economics, political science, and management literature tend to
operationalize politics using constructs drawn from the economic theory of regulation. Qualitative studies have
been less systematic in theorizing political inﬂuences, tending instead to generate grounded insights about political inﬂuences observed in particular research contexts. Nonetheless, there is substantial convergence in many of
the political constructs theorized by quantitative and qualitative scholars to inﬂuence regulatory outcomes. At the
highest level of generality, both are interested in the inﬂuence of elected ofﬁcials, the structure of government
institutions, and the inﬂuence of interest groups. This suggests the deep and abiding inﬂuence of economic and
political science theories about politics and regulation.
3.2.1. Elected ofﬁcials
In the category of elected ofﬁcials, researchers commonly investigate how enforcement levels in different regulatory programs are inﬂuenced by the party afﬁliation of political principles with authority over regulators, including: the president (Moe 1982, 1985; Scholz et al. 1991; Shrock 2013) or prime minister (Almond & Esbester
2016); state governors (Scholz & Wei 1986; Shrock 2013); local, state, and federal legislative bodies (Hutter 1989;
Scholz et al. 1991; Carpenter 2002; Mosely 2008; Berliner et al. 2015; Innes & Mitra 2015; Almond & Esbester
8
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Table 1 Map of Constructs and Measures
Quantitative Studies

Qualitative Studies

CONSTRUCT AND MEASURE CONVERGENCE
Party afﬁliation of political principals
Party afﬁliation of local population
Ideology of political principals
Congressional oversight
Electoral constituency of political principals

ELECTED OFFICIALS
Party afﬁliation of political principals
Support of political principles
Political pressure

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
Agency resources
Agency resources
Political appointments
Bureaucratic support for enforcement
Executive control/agency independence
Autonomy
Government level
Procedural constraints on regulators
Electoral Rules
Agency reputation
Labor
Lobbying
Media
Community collective action potential
Community political power
Community political orientation
Issue salience
Consumer social attitudes

INTEREST GROUPS
Labor
Lobbying
Community activism
NGO pressure
Media
Industry
State-civil society linkages
Support of interested constituencies
Barriers to collective action
Corruption

MEASURE CONVERGENCE/ CONSTRUCT DIVERGENCE
COSTS OF ENFORCEMENT
Employment
Inﬂation
Employer viability
Employer market dominance
Trade policy

ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Employment
GDP
Employer viability
Local economic dependencies

CONSTRUCT AND MEASURE DIVERGENCE
BENEFITS OF ENFORCEMENT
Health beneﬁts
Property value
Damage avoidance

PUBLIC OPINION
Public awareness and concern about regulatory problems
Anti-regulation sentiment
Societal support for enforcement
Perceived legitimacy of regulators
Agency reputation
POLITICAL CULTURE
Ideology
National political culture
Inequality
Political polarization
Cultural scripts: “Regulatory myths”
SUB-POLITICS
Dialogue and negotiation with stakeholders
INDIVIDUAL POLITICS
Personal political views of bureaucrats
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2018); and various subgroups in legislative bodies, particularly congressional oversight committees (Wood 1988;
Wood & Waterman 1991; Helland 1998; Kleit et al. 1998). Some quantitative researchers have looked beyond
party afﬁliation to the ideology of political principals (Moe 1985; Scholz & Wei 1986; Huber 2007; Delmas &
Toffel 2008; Kim 2008). The popularity of this construct in quantitative studies may be an artifact of the ready
availability of ideology indices compiled by interest groups like the AFL-CIO and the League of Conservation
Voters (Moe 1985; Scholz & Wei 1986; Delmas & Toffel 2008; Kim 2008).
Many qualitative researchers have framed the focal political construct as the level of “political support” regulators have for their enforcement activities. Political support is not always explicitly deﬁned, and its meaning varies across studies. Haines (2011) conceptualizes political support as the protection senior-level political
appointees provide to frontline regulators to resist pressure from industry to weaken regulatory proposals. Political support can also encompass policy agreement between frontline regulators and political principals (Lo &
Leung 2000; Lo & Fryxell 2005; Lo et al. 2006; May & Winter 2009; Van Rooij 2010; Van Rooij et al. 2013) or
funding for enforcement activities (Van Rooij & Lo 2010). The converse of support is political pressure, or the
extent to which politicians try to compel regulators to enforce laws in certain ways (Ronconi 2010; Mills & Koliba
2015). A handful of studies have broadened the inquiry into electoral politics to investigate not just the actions of
politicians but also the base of their popular political support. For instance, Huber (2007) looks at how the party
afﬁliation of the local population inﬂuences the propensity of workers to lodge complaints with health and safety
regulators, and Holland (2015, 2017) examines the demographics of local political principals’ electoral constituencies and the extent to which various constituencies wish to see certain regulations enforced.
3.2.2. Structure of government institutions
Quantitative and qualitative researchers also share a common interest in the way political arrangements are
sedimented into the structure of government institutions and how these structural features inﬂuence regulatory
outcomes. Both quantitative and qualitative researchers have attended to the inﬂuence of agency enforcement
resources, most commonly budget and staff (Hutter 1986, 1989; Lo & Leung 2000; Lo et al. 2006; McAllister
2008; Van Rooij & Lo 2010; Haines 2011; Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock 2013; Amengual 2014, 2016; Shimshack 2014;
Mills & Koliba 2015; Jackson & Zhang 2016). Studies in the development literature tend to characterize this construct as “capacity” (e.g. Lo et al. 2006; McAllister 2010; Van Rooij & Lo 2010). Huber (2007) examines how the
intensity of enforcement efforts is inﬂuenced by a more nuanced resource-related construct: government “reinvention” initiatives that impact the ﬂow and allocation of resources to Occupational Safety & Health Administration ﬁeld ofﬁces.
There is broad interest across disciplines and methodologies in the extent to which bureaucratic structure
allows for executive control of the bureaucracy, captured in some studies by the inﬂuence of political appointees
(Wood 1988; Wood & Waterman 1991), centralization of agency decisionmaking processes (Wood & Waterman
1991), and the independent status or autonomy of regulators (Edelman et al. 1991; Wood & Waterman 1991;
McAllister 2008, 2010; Pires 2008; Coslovsky & Locke 2013). Many studies have examined whether different
levels of government in the US federalist system enforce regulation differently (Magat & Viscusi 1990; Scholz
et al. 1991; Earnhart 2004; Gray & Shadbegian 2004; Deily & Gray 2007; Morantz 2009). Qualitative studies have
focused more on the procedural constraints on regulators, including participation rights afforded to various constituencies (Hutter 2001), procedural hurdles to enforcement (Lo & Leung 2000; Hutter 2001; Mosely 2008; Van
Rooij 2010; Eisner 2017), and judicial checks on agency enforcement decisions (Verweij 2000; Waller 2007; Van
Rooij 2010). Holland (2015, 2017) looks at the structure of electoral institutions and the extent to which they
enable poor voters, who favor non-enforcement of municipal regulations regarding housing and street vending,
to elect local politicians who will ease enforcement burdens.
3.2.3. Interest groups
The third main area of construct convergence is around the inﬂuence of interest groups. Quantitative researchers
have been particularly interested in the inﬂuence of unions on regulatory enforcement (Moe 1985; Scholz & Wei
1986; Weil 1991; Brown 1995; Gray & Mendeloff 2005; Huber 2007; Mosely 2008; Morantz 2011, 2013; Berliner
et al. 2015). Qualitative research on compliance with private labor standards in global supply chains likewise has
highlighted the role of unions and their representatives in promoting better compliance with labor standards
(Bartley & Egels-Zandén 2015). There has been some attention in both domains to the role of lobbying
10
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(Bardach & Kagan 1982; Hood et al. 2001; Carpenter 2002; Cebula et al. 2014). Researchers have looked at the
inﬂuence of NGOs on regulatory compliance and enforcement outcomes (Rodríguez-Garavito 2005; Seidman
2007; Amengual 2010; Bartley & Egels-Zandén 2015). Much of this work has been in the context of private, transnational regulation, and not in domestic regulatory contexts as contemplated by the theory of “tripartism.” Studies in this domain also have examined how consumers’ political preferences are related to the rigor with which
private regulation is enforced by global brands (Toffel et al. 2015).
Some studies have conceptualized the media as a civil society actor with the potential to inﬂuence regulatory
compliance and enforcement practices, for instance, by conducting investigations of regulated factories (Van
Rooij 2010), publishing exposés of rampant noncompliance (Tilt 2007; Van Rooij 2010), providing avenues for
exposure of noncompliance (Toffel et al. 2015), or shaping regulators’ perceptions of public support for their
enforcement practices (Lo et al. 2006). Several studies – although surprisingly few in light of the prominence of
capture theory in regulatory scholarship – investigate industry inﬂuence on enforcement (Amengual 2010; Van
Rooij 2010; Van Rooij & Lo 2010; Coslovsky & Locke 2013). In addition to the inﬂuence by particular types of
civil society actors, researchers have investigated the structural conditions that might enable (or impede) interest
group formation and efﬁcacy, including the salience of regulatory issues (Carpenter 2002; Hutter & Jones 2007;
Kim 2008), barriers to collective action (Van Rooij 2010), and linkages between regulators and civil society
groups (Amengual 2014, 2016; Amengual & Fine 2016). Research also has investigated how corrupt relationships
with civil society actors can inﬂuence government enforcement of regulation (McAllister 2008, 2010).
There has been much attention to community activism in the literature on compliance and enforcement
(Hamilton 1993; Kagan et al. 2003; Earnhart 2004; Gray & Shadbegian 2004; Gunningham et al. 2004a,b; Van
Rooij 2006, 2010; Tilt 2007; Delmas & Toffel 2008; Van Rooij & Lo 2010; Ashenmiller & Norman 2011), but
there are important differences in the way qualitative and quantitative researchers conceptualize and measure this
construct. Qualitative research tends to measure actual occurrences of activism, while quantitative research measures the potential for activism. The latter conceptualization is grounded in the economic theory of regulation,
speciﬁcally, public choice theories of political mobilization. Drawing on these theories, quantitative variables representing community activism measure the potential for activism based on the likely costs and beneﬁts to communities of mobilizing, as well as their resource-based capacity to do so. Commonly used metrics include: voter
turnout (Hamilton 1993); membership in environmental NGOs (Delmas & Toffel 2008); the interaction of voter
turnout with NGO membership (Gray & Shadbegian 2004); the existence of state legislation inhibiting lawsuits
against corporate targets (Ashenmiller & Norman 2011); population size (Earnhart 2004); education (Earnhart
2004); poverty levels (Hamilton 1993), party afﬁliation (Scholz et al. 1991; Earnhart 2004); and racial composition
(Hamilton 1993; Gray & Shadbegian 2004).
By contrast, qualitative researchers focus on actual rather than potential instances of activism using measures
such as: levels of community support for or resistance to local industry (Kagan et al. 2003; Gunningham et al.
2004a,b); instances of resistance to regulatory enforcement by local stakeholders (Van Rooij 2006); citizen complaints to regulators (Tilt 2007; Van Rooij 2010; Van Rooij & Lo 2010); and demonstrations (Van Rooij 2010).
Finally, drawing on elements of both institutional structure and interest group conceptions of politics,
researchers have addressed how the enforcing agency’s reputation inﬂuences the enforcement outcomes it is able
to achieve (Carpenter 2010; Gilad & Yogev 2012; Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2013; Etienne 2015). The construct
of “reputation” encompasses stakeholder beliefs about the agency’s capacity to effectively pursue its mission and
the network of interest groups allied with the agency in pursuit of this mission (Carpenter 2002).

3.3. Construct divergence
3.3.1. Economic conditions or costs of compliance and enforcement?
Quantitative and qualitative researchers diverge more signiﬁcantly in their conceptualization of other political
constructs. Consistent with the economic theory of regulation, quantitative researchers have sought to measure
the costs and beneﬁts of enforcement in order to predict the level of demand for it. Lost employment opportunities are often used to capture the costs of regulatory enforcement. For instance, studies hypothesize that regulators will avoid stringent enforcement of regulation in communities that have high levels of unemployment (Moe
1985; Deily & Gray 1991; Huber 2007), that are highly dependent on a small group of regulated employers
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(Deily & Gray 1991), or where employers are economically vulnerable (Deily & Gray 1991). Regulators are said
to adjust their enforcement practices in response to economic conditions because “[t]he political costs of having
regulatory enforcement behavior cause, or even appear to cause, a plant to shut down may induce regulators to
direct their enforcement toward plants for which the probability of closing, and the adjustment cost if closing
occurs, are lower” (Deily & Gray 1991, p. 263). Studies have hypothesized further that enforcement practices will
be most sensitive to these kinds of economic hardships at the state level, where the political repercussions of local
economic hardships are likely to be felt most acutely (Gray & Shadbegian 2004; Deily & Gray 2007; Morantz
2009). The economic hardships attributed to regulation typically are measured using variables for local unemployment rates, plant-level costs of compliance, and the probability of a plant closing. Qualitative researchers
have used similar measures of economic conditions in their studies, but they do not characterize them as “costs”
of regulatory enforcement. These studies conceptualize employment (Hutter & Manning 1990; Ronconi 2010),
GDP (Van Rooij & Lo 2010), ﬁrm viability (Hutter 1997; Tilt 2007), and local economic dependencies (Van Rooij
2006; Van Rooij & Lo 2010) as providing economic context or explaining political pressures on regulators.
3.3.2. Beneﬁts of enforcement
Quantitative researchers are alone in their consideration of the beneﬁts of enforcement. This construct has been
employed in the context of environmental regulation, where it is hypothesized that the beneﬁts of pollution control will be greater in communities where many people beneﬁt from it and where the beneﬁts are greater due to
the high volume of pollution, the high value the community places on mitigating environmental harm, or the
community’s sensitivity to pollution (Earnhart 2004). Variables for local population size, facility-level emissions,
per capita income, and local ambient air quality measure these constructs (Earnhart 2004).
3.3.3. Public opinion
Qualitative studies employ additional categories of political constructs not found in quantitative work, including:
public opinion, political culture, and micro-politics. Qualitative researchers have been particularly interested in
investigating the relationship between regulatory enforcement levels and public sentiment about regulation. Studies most often conceptualize the relevant construct as something akin to the public’s awareness of and concern
about regulatory problems, and they typically use media coverage of regulatory issues to measure this (Bardach &
Kagan 1982; Hawkins 1984; Hutter 1986, 1989, 1997, 2001, 2011; Gunningham 1987; Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock
1992, 2013; Lo & Leung 2000; Hood et al. 2001; Hutter & Jones 2007; Haines 2011; Almond & Esbester 2016).
Although these studies, like some discussed above, draw on media accounts of regulation, they are categorized
separately because they do not conceptualize the media as a civil society actor responsible for inﬂuencing regulators directly or mobilizing interest groups to do so. Rather, in the studies discussed here, media accounts of regulation are measures of public knowledge and views, or they are “cultural scripts” that reﬂect and inform public
knowledge and views (Almond 2009).
Hutter (1989, 1997, 2001, 2011; Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock 1990) has written extensively on how public concern
about particular risks or catastrophes can prompt more stringent regulatory enforcement. As Hawkins (1984,
p. 97) put it, for many regulators, “the working deﬁnition of a ‘serious’ [problem] is ‘basically anything that’s
going to cause a great amount of public reaction’.” Others have theorized that negative public opinion of certain
regulations or enforcement tactics can weaken regulatory enforcement (Hutter & Jones 2007; Almond & Esbester
2016). Public views reﬂecting moral and political ambivalence regarding certain types of regulatory rule-breaking
can likewise constrain the types of enforcement actions agencies take (Hawkins 1984; Hutter & Manning 1990).
Some studies gage levels of public support for enforcement based on survey responses (Lo & Fryxell 2005; Van
Rooij et al. 2013) or interviews with regulators (Edelman et al. 1991). Others characterize the relevant construct
as the perceived legitimacy of regulators based on the level of public consensus about the validity of regulatory
goals (Van Rooij 2006), the moral culpability of regulatory violations (Parker 2006), or the regulator’s efﬁcacy in
mitigating public harms (Haines 2011). The construct of reputation similarly captures the public’s perception of
the regulator’s efﬁcacy in pursuing its mandate (Carpenter 2002; Gilad & Yogev 2012; Etienne 2015).
3.3.4. Political culture
Macro-level constructs, like political culture and political economy, have played an important role in explaining
regulatory compliance and enforcement outcomes in some studies based on the premise that these “political
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© 2019 The Author. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd

Politics of enforcement and compliance

J. L. Short

philosophies and projects have the capacity to undermine … effective regulation” (Haines 2011, p. 23). Scholars
have investigated how regulatory compliance and enforcement are shaped by anti-regulatory ideologies (Hutter &
Manning 1990; Balaton-Chrimes & Haines 2015, 2016; Almond & Esbester 2016, 2018), neoliberal ideologies of
individual responsibilization (Gray 2006, 2009), and political-economic systems like capitalism (BalatonChrimes & Haines 2015, 2016). Studies have also investigated the inﬂuence of national political cultures – for
instance, corporatism vs. pluralism (Verweij 2000), adversarial legalism (Kagan & Axelrad 2000), and the political
appetite for criminalizing corporate conduct (Almond 2015). Research also has suggested that political-economic
conditions like extreme inequality inﬂuence the extent to which certain regulations are enforced (BalatonChrimes & Haines 2016).
3.3.5. Micro-political perspectives
Finally, a body of qualitative scholarship focuses on the micro-politics of regulation, including how the political
views of individual regulators (Lipsky 1980; Edelman et al. 1991; Lo et al. 2006; May & Winter 2009) and the
interaction of regulatory actors with one another construct compliance and enforcement outcomes (Coslovsky
2009; Coslovsky et al. 2011; Haines 2011; Huising & Silbey 2011; Pires 2011). For instance, Coslovsky et al.
(2011) describe how Brazilian carnival operators and labor inspectors engaged in dialogue to arrive at a solution
to protect the core employment rights of seasonal carnival workers while maintaining the ﬂexibility and informality traditionally associated with these temporary and highly ﬂuid employment arrangements.
3.4. Mechanisms
Although studies have identiﬁed a wide array of political actors and institutions that might inﬂuence regulatory
compliance and enforcement, less progress has been made to ascertain the mechanisms by which they do so
(Kim 2008). Existing research tends to elide both the direction and the pathways of inﬂuence. Qualitative research
on public opinion is emblematic of this problem. While many studies ﬁnd a relationship between public attitudes
about regulation and enforcement levels, they often fail to consider the direction of causality. The assumption
tends to be that public opinion inﬂuences enforcement levels and styles adopted by regulators. But it is also possible that public opinion about regulation is, itself, shaped by the way regulators enforce the law (Lowi & Nicholson
2009). Assuming that public attitudes do, indeed, inﬂuence regulators’ practices, studies fail to explain how such
inﬂuence is exerted. Is it because politicians pressure regulators to address problems that concern their constituents? Do regulators respond directly to public demands, without the intervention of politicians? Are regulators’
own preferences constructed by those around them in the broader public? One UK regulator illustrates the problem when he reports to researchers: “I even ﬁnd it difﬁcult to grasp sometimes what ‘public concern’ actually
means, or what ‘the wider public’ means” (Almond & Esbester 2016, p. 279). Sorting out these relationships is
crucial to understanding the politics of regulatory compliance and enforcement.
Almond and Esbester (2016) provide one of the more elaborate accounts of the concept of public opinion
and the mechanisms by which it shapes regulatory enforcement. They argue that it is not public opinion per se,
that inﬂuences regulators’ enforcement practices, but rather how the relevant public and its opinions are constituted. So, for instance, in the early post-war years, health and safety regulation was thought to be “a narrow area
of concern, ﬁt only for the attention of employers, employees, and unions” (Almond & Esbester 2016, p. 284).
The late twentieth century saw the politicization of health and safety regulation as a wider cross section of the
public began to participate in debates about health and safety regulation. High proﬁle disasters covered extensively in the media roused the interest of the broader public in health and safety regulation and provided political
cover for regulators targeted by anti-regulation politicians. “It thus became very difﬁcult for even a deregulatory
government to take action that might be construed as exposing the general populace to risk, and post-disaster
reforms tended to strengthen the hand of the regulator rather than weaken them” (Almond & Esbester 2016,
p. 288). Public opinion became more fractured and contested after the turn of the century, resulting in a more
ambiguous relationship with regulatory outcomes and providing less political cover for regulators to resist the
commands of deregulatory political principals. Almond and Esbester (2016) also reveal that regulators are not
merely passive absorbers of public opinion, but that they actively seek to cultivate public opinion in support of
their work. For instance, they recount that a high-ranking British labor inspection ofﬁcial saw it as “part of the
job of the Inspectorate to develop an informed public and to harness the force of its informed opinion to the
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improvement of industrial conditions” and that, accordingly, the agency was “considering a much more active
approach to the development of public opinion” (Almond & Esbester 2016, p. 281).
Research on environmental law enforcement in China has sought to better understand the mechanisms of
public opinion by investigating how its relationship to enforcement can be moderated by other political variables.
For example, Lo and Fryxell (2005) ﬁnd that while both government support and societal support (public opinion
favoring enforcement) have a positive relationship with enforcement outcomes, these two independent variables
have an inverse relationship. When government support for enforcement is low, strong public opinion in favor of
enforcement can undermine regulators by placing unreasonable pressure on them to produce results that they
lack the bureaucratic capacity to achieve. Subsequent studies have continued to investigate the interaction
between public and bureaucratic support for regulation and have extended these ﬁndings by showing that the
relationship between governmental and societal support for enforcement changes over time. While studies using
data from 2000 found that societal support was most inﬂuential when combined with government support (Lo &
Fryxell 2005; Lo et al. 2006), Van Rooij et al. (2013) demonstrate that by 2006, the two had a complementary
relationship, with societal support compensating for low levels of government support. They attribute this change
to the increasing power and capacity of civil society actors in China during this time period.
Quantitative studies based on the economic theory of regulation exhibit similar shortcomings in addressing
mechanisms. The economic theory of regulation asserts that price is the mechanism driving regulatory outcomes.
However, while this axiom motivates the political variables that many quantitative researchers use, the causal
relationship between these variables and regulatory outcomes has gone largely untested. According to the economic theory of regulation, for instance, collective action by local communities inﬂuences compliance outcomes
because it can raise the price of noncompliance through one of two pathways. First, communities with political
clout can pressure regulators to enforce the law more stringently (Scholz & Wei 1986; Gray & Shadbegian 2007).
Second, irrespective of their effect on government regulatory enforcement activities, politically active communities
can inﬂuence the behavior of regulated companies directly by raising the costs of noncompliance. For example,
active communities can impose costs on noncompliant companies by contesting their activities, opposing their
zoning licenses or operating permits, or suing them for regulatory violations (Hamilton 1993). Thus, the more
politically active a community, the more likely ﬁrms in that community will incur costs for poor compliance, and
thus the more likely they are to comply with their regulatory obligations (Hamilton 1999). Conversely, environmental justice studies have theorized that communities lacking political power will experience worse compliance
and enforcement outcomes because poor communities and communities of color will have difﬁculty imposing
costs on noncompliant ﬁrms (Hamilton 1995; Gray & Shadbegian 2007). There is a rich causal story behind these
hypotheses. However, the activities theorized to raise the costs of noncompliance are not empirically measured
and tested by existing studies. Instead, studies operationalize the potential for such activities using variables that
proxy for communities’ capacity to exercise political power, like voter turnout and NGO membership. Moreover,
the economic theory and the studies employing it do not address how a community’s political capacity develops
or how it is conveyed to and absorbed by regulators.
Research on the inﬂuence of elected ofﬁcials similarly elides the question of causal pathways. While several
studies ﬁnd correlations between the preferences of political representatives and the enforcement of federal laws,
“these papers do not address the potential endogeneity of the political variables with unobservables (such as constituent preferences) potentially driving both attributes of the political representatives and enforcement outcomes” (Innes & Mitra 2015, p. 523). In one of the few studies that attempts to do so, Innes and Mitra (2015)
adopt a unique identiﬁcation strategy to isolate the causal effect of political representation on enforcement levels.
Looking only at US congressional districts where elections were very close (to eliminate the hypothesis that regulatory outcomes are driven by strong citizen preferences) and open (meaning that no incumbent was running, to
eliminate another strong source of selection bias), they ﬁnd that the election of a Republican representative leads
to a 20 to 30 percent reduction in the probability that a constituent facility will be subject to a Clean Air Act
inspection by the US Environmental Protection Agency – conﬁrming that these representatives exert some inﬂuence on the agency, independent of constituent preferences.
Huber (2007) likewise tries to tease apart the mechanisms by which political inﬂuences shape a variety of different enforcement outcomes at the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Building on prior
research ﬁnding that worker complaints are an important driver of OSHA enforcement (Scholz & Wei 1986),
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Huber (2007) reveals how the political preferences of workers (rather than their political representatives) shape
the allocation of OSHA inspection resources through their use of the complaint process. Complaints are brought
more frequently by union workers and workers in more dangerous industries, but complaints tend to be
depressed by poor economic conditions, particularly among nonunion workers. However, this dampening effect
is offset in areas heavily populated by Democratic constituencies supportive of OSHA. Similarly, Huber (2007)
ﬁnds that the stringency of OSHA inspections is not inﬂuenced directly by local political conditions, but rather
by variations in the level of cooperation between businesses and workers with OSHA inspectors (which is related
to local political conditions). Taken together, these ﬁndings paint a portrait of an agency that is insulated from
direct control by political principles – meaning that it is able to exercise some measure of bureaucratic neutrality –
but that is permeable to the political preferences of local constituencies through the behavior of private businesses
and their workers.
Studies like these suggest how scholarship can move from a conversation about who and what politically
inﬂuences regulatory compliance and enforcement, to a more nuanced understanding of how these inﬂuences
operate and how they shape one another.
4. Contributions and limitations of existing research
The different streams of empirical research on the politics of compliance and enforcement offer important
insights for one another and suggest fruitful areas for dialogue across disciplinary and methodological boundaries.
Qualitative studies reveal the rich variety and complexity of political inﬂuences on enforcement across a range of
empirical contexts. Collectively, they provide a broad conception of what politics encompasses by looking beyond
electoral politics and formal political institutions to investigate speciﬁc moments of contestation by groups and
individuals as well as the role of structural factors, like culture and ideology, in shaping regulatory outcomes. In
this way, they gesture toward a more “multi-faced” (Lukes 2005) conception of politics that not only encompasses
the ability to impose one’s will over resistance in active conﬂicts, but also includes the ability to control what conﬂicts get placed on the political agenda and to shape the construction of taken-for-granted assumptions about
how the world works – including what is regulable and what is not. In addition, these studies cover a range of
different countries and regions, including North America, Europe, Asia, and South America, providing a fuller
account of variation in political systems than is currently available in quantitative research, which to date has
focused largely on the US regulatory context.
At the same time, the qualitative literature has several limitations. First, there has been little attempt to synthesize the range of political inﬂuences identiﬁed under a common theoretical umbrella. Scant work has been
done to theorize which political constructs matter, under which conditions, and how they interact with one
another. Instead, politics in one of its many guises tends to enter qualitative studies as a post hoc explanation for
observations in the ﬁeld. These rich ﬁndings have not grounded larger theoretical advances.
Second, these studies operationalize politics in widely varied ways and at widely divergent scales: from the
most macro-level to the most micro-level (sometimes within the same study). At the macro end of this spectrum,
studies have investigated how the enforcement of international human rights by private dispute resolution bodies
is impeded by violent conﬂict and class struggle (Balaton-Chrimes & Haines 2016) and fundamentally conﬂicting
ontologies of development (Balaton-Chrimes & Haines 2015). At the micro-level, research examines the day-today negotiation that occurs between individual regulators and employees of regulated entities (Coslovsky et al.
2011). Haines (2011) points variously to ideological contests over the role of state and market, as well as parochial
disputes between regulators and regulated entities, as important determinants of regulatory outcomes. The relationship between these different registers is not well articulated in the literature.
Third, the lack of dialogue among qualitative studies on the relationship between politics and regulatory compliance and enforcement has hindered theoretical development. The absence of dialogue on this point is conspicuous because many of these scholars are in dialogue on other theoretical and empirical issues – for instance, the
relationship between enforcement practices and compliance outcomes. However, there are notable exceptions to
be found in research clusters on the enforcement of labor law in Latin America (Piore & Schrank 2008; Coslovsky
2009; Coslovsky et al. 2011; Pires 2011; Amengual 2014, 2016) and environmental law in China (Lo & Fryxell
2005; Van Rooij 2006; Tilt 2007; Van Rooij & Lo 2010; Van Rooij et al. 2013). These scholarly communities are
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engaged in sustained conversations about the inﬂuence of politics on regulatory enforcement and compliance,
and they provide a useful model for a research agenda that foregrounds politics.
The quantitative literature likewise contains important lessons about studying political inﬂuences on regulatory outcomes. Most notably, many quantitative studies elaborately theorize the political constructs they investigate, justifying the explanatory value of political variables under a common theoretical framework: the economic
theory of regulation. This theoretical framework channels the development of political constructs toward a universe of political variables hypothesized to measure the costs or beneﬁts of compliance and enforcement to regulators, regulated entities, and communities. Putting aside the substantive critiques of this theoretical framework,
the methodological approach – convergence toward a common set of constructs and measures united by a coherent theoretical narrative – is instructive for researchers interested in systematically studying the relationship
between politics and regulatory enforcement and compliance.
In addition, quantitative studies generally have been closer in dialogue with one another on issues of politics
than qualitative studies. This interchange has enabled quantitative research to build on and extend previous
empirical insights and has yielded convergence around some common metrics to measure political inﬂuences on
regulation. Quantitative compliance and enforcement studies that do not hypothesize political variables routinely
control for them using the measures developed in prior research, reinforcing the pervasive importance of political
context to regulatory outcomes across the wider body of research (e.g. Gray & Jones 1991; Stafford 2002;
Potoski & Prakash 2005a,b; Shimshack & Ward 2005, 2008; Howard-Grenville et al. 2008; Short & Toffel 2008;
Earnhart 2009; Short & Toffel 2010; Toffel & Short 2011).
Despite these contributions, quantitative research on political inﬂuences has limitations. First, while the common theoretical framework is methodologically beneﬁcial, it is not clear that the dominant theoretical framework
in these studies identiﬁes the complete or correct set of political constructs to capture the breadth and nature of
political inﬂuences on regulation. These studies tend to accept, uncritically, the stylized assumptions of the economic theory. They privilege a narrow conception that reduces politics to the costs and beneﬁts of enforcement
and the strategic behavior by interest groups, regulators, and elected ofﬁcials over the broader and more nuanced
set of political inﬂuences identiﬁed in the qualitative literature. While this may make for a coherent narrative of
politics and enforcement, it also may distort the narrative and leave critical parts of the story untold. To be sure,
these variable preferences are partly an artifact of the measurement imperatives of quantitative research. However, it is worth considering whether gaps could be ﬁlled by attempting to quantify a broader set of political constructs, including some of those developed in qualitative research.
Second, there is an uneasy ﬁt between constructs and measures in quantitative studies. For instance, a
community’s potential for political mobilization is commonly measured as voter turnout in a recent national election (Hamilton 1993). While this measure ﬁnds some support in political science studies documenting “that those
individuals more likely to become involved in community political action … report a higher tendency to vote
than others” (Hamilton 1993, p. 107), it is crude. Opinions on regulation are highly polarized, and it is not clear
whether politically active communities would push for more or less regulatory enforcement. This renders the
results of studies using this measure difﬁcult to interpret. Moreover, ﬁndings obtained using this measure may
not be not generalizable to the many national contexts where voting is mandatory. Some studies have attempted
to reﬁne measures of political mobilization by including variables for membership in environmental NGOs
(Gray & Shadbegian 2004; Delmas & Toffel 2008; Grooms 2015; Innes & Mitra 2015) or party afﬁliation
(Hamilton 1999; Earnhart 2004; Gray & Shadbegian 2007). While these measures are more precise proxies for
collective action potential than voter turnout, they remain blunt, and the studies that employ them likewise fail to
investigate speciﬁc instances of citizen or interest group mobilization and their effects on regulatory outcomes.
The beneﬁt of pollution reduction is another construct in tension with its measure. Per capita income has been
used as a proxy for the value of pollution reduction because “as a community’s income per capita rises, the
community’s valuation of damages rises” (Earnhart 2004, p. 654). This measure ignores the possibility that
wealthy voters may not be environmentally conscious and the fact that conservation and environmental protection are motivated primarily by non-monetary values.
The studies have one collective limitation worth noting: there is little empirical research in either the qualitative or quantitative literature on how political pressure by regulated industry shapes regulatory enforcement and
compliance (But see Scholz & Wei 1986; Hutter 2001; Haines 2011; Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock 2013; Mills & Koliba
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2015). This is surprising given the pervasive intellectual inﬂuence of capture theory, and it is concerning in light
of the broad anecdotal consensus that the concerted political activities of regulated industries have eroded the
enforcement of many regulatory protections (McGarity 2013). On the qualitative side, this oversight may be due
to scholars’ disciplinary resistance to capture theory’s stylized rational choice epistemology and their desire to
reveal the more subtle ways that organizations shape the law (Edelman & Suchman 1997; Edelman & Talesh
2011). Quantitative researchers may shrink from these questions because attempts to model regulated entities’
inﬂuence on their own levels of compliance or enforcement suffer from complicated endogeneity problems.
While these theoretical commitments and empirical challenges are understandable, they should not stand as a
barrier to investigation of a signal inﬂuence on regulatory outcomes today: the strategic political contestation of
enforcement by regulated entities and their political allies.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the analysis presented in this article. First, the article’s focus on the compliance and enforcement literature neglects other phases at which politics enters the regulatory process, including preference formation, agenda setting, policy adoption and diffusion, and institutional
design. This potentially limits the number and types of political variables identiﬁed. Furthermore, it fails to capture the ways in which regulators’ ability to enforce the law and regulated entities’ willingness to comply with the
law are shaped by the nature and consequences of political inﬂuence at all stages of the regulatory process. A
broader synthesis of the literature is necessary for a more complete account.
Second, the article’s focus on studies that explicitly articulate “politics” as a construct results in the omission
of important literature on organizations and professions. The “ofﬁce politics” described in these studies are critical to explaining enforcement and compliance outcomes, and this activity certainly could be characterized as
“political” in a broader sense. However, for purposes of this article, I decided not to impose this characterization
on studies that do not adopt it themselves. While acknowledging the potential value of the broader organizational
and professional literature to this project, the article seeks to underscore the importance of explicitly theorizing
politics. The theoretical frame of “sub-politics” discussed above is a valuable effort to integrate organizational and
professional considerations into conceptions of the politics of regulation.
Third, the focus of this article is methodological, not substantive. It investigates how researchers address questions about the relationship between politics and regulation rather than the substantive answers they ﬁnd. Much
work remains for future research to synthesize the substantive ﬁndings of the collected studies.
5. Discussion
The analysis presented in this article reveals important insights about the place of politics in enforcement and
compliance scholarship and provides valuable tools for advancing knowledge in this domain. First, it demonstrates that political constructs can indeed be operationalized and studied empirically to ascertain their relationship to compliance and enforcement outcomes, and it provides researchers with a rich set of templates for
doing so.
Second, this article brings together for the ﬁrst time studies that address a common set of theoretical and
empirical questions about politics and regulation but that have developed largely in isolation from one another.
While there has been signiﬁcant dialogue across disciplinary and methodological divides in the broader enforcement and compliance literature, there has been little cross-fertilization in empirical research on politics. Identifying these studies as a distinct research ﬁeld will help future researchers to: establish what is known empirically
about the relationship between politics and enforcement, identify where the most signiﬁcant open questions lie,
and extend existing theoretical and empirical insights.
Third, the study reveals key areas of convergence and divergence on relevant political constructs in the quantitative and qualitative literature, including the dominance of the economic theory of regulation. Broad convergence between the two suggests that there are meaningful possibilities for cross-disciplinary dialogue, while areas
of divergence suggest the gaps in each and the payoffs to dialogue. The most signiﬁcant convergence is around
constructs drawn from the economic theory of regulation. Although many deep critiques have been leveled at the
economic theory, it continues to provide key variables that form the basis of understandings about political inﬂuences on regulation across a range of different disciplines. This may be, in part, because economic theory not only
hypothesizes how different actors exercise power to achieve their objectives, but it also deeply shapes assumptions
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about how the world works – including what conceivably can be regulated and how. This suggests the need to
more rigorously theorize politics beyond the economic theory.
Fourth, while theory development is beyond the scope of this article, the analysis presented here suggests four
key considerations to inform theory generation going forward. First, theory should deﬁne the scope of what politics includes. The political inﬂuences research identiﬁes will depend on “how wide the lens is through which one
is looking for power” (Lukes 2005, p.72). The collected studies raise the question of whether “politics” encompasses contestation of any kind or whether it should be deﬁned more narrowly in terms of contestation tied to
governmental or electoral institutions. Perhaps the aperture should be broadened beyond instances of active contestation to encompass other forms of power (Lukes 2005), like the ability to place issues on and keep issues off
of the regulatory agenda or the shaping of perceptions and preferences. The boundaries might be drawn differently in different regulatory contexts. Theory should seek to articulate not only where the boundaries are, but also
the stakes of drawing them in different places.
Second, theory should address the mechanisms by which the relevant constructs shape regulatory outcomes. It is
important to understand how political constructs are constituted, conveyed, received, and enacted. For instance, it
may be well established that public views about regulation are associated with regulatory enforcement levels. But how
are those views constituted, by what actors, and through what means? How are they conveyed to and received by regulators? Do regulators monitor public opinion and feel beholden to respond, even though they are not elected? Are
regulators pressured by political appointees or elected ofﬁcials to effectuate the will of the public? Are regulators’ views
of what is appropriate constituted by those around them, such that they come to share the public’s views? There are
many ways in which even a single political construct might shape regulatory enforcement outcomes, and future
research should theorize and test which mechanisms drive which types of outcomes within which contexts.
Third, a theory of the politics of regulation must consider questions of scale and linkage (Ford 2013). Scholars
have explained regulatory outcomes variously as a function of macro-ideologies like neoliberalism as well as onthe-ground struggles among interest groups and even individuals. They have looked at formal political structures
like governmental departments and elected representatives as well as social movements and citizen activism. This
suggests the need for more explicit investigation of the relationships linking different political registers. For
instance, what are the connections among political ideologies, citizens, and elected representatives, and how
might they combine to inﬂuence regulators?
Fourth, theory must not ignore other axes of variation. Regulation comprises myriad programs, policy
domains, legal and task environments. Politics is one variable among many that may inﬂuence compliance and
enforcement outcomes. With so many potentially relevant causal variables operating in so many different contexts, there can be no single, parsimonious explanatory model of regulatory behavior (Kagan 1994), and this article does not call for one. Rather, it calls for greater attention to variations in political conditions and how those
contingencies interact with other drivers of regulatory outcomes.
Finally, the approach to regulation and governance scholarship presented here can help to advance critical
perspectives on the ﬁeld. There is a tendency in the ﬁeld to privilege technical explanations of regulatory outcomes over explanations grounded in political theory and power. There is a tendency to take political conditions
such as neoliberal markets and autonomous bureaucracies for granted. As discussed in the introduction, the
immediate aim of this article is technocratic: to advance empirical understandings of when and how regulation
works by surfacing the political inﬂuences shaping it. However, this undertaking also may contribute to more
deeply critical projects. I anticipate that foregrounding politics will open new lines of critique – particularly to the
extent that politics includes normative considerations and issues of power and its distribution. While this is not
my immediate project, it would be a welcome development.
6. Conclusion
This article suggests the enormous challenges and possibilities for research attempting to better understand how
politics shape regulatory outcomes. It renews longstanding calls to develop a body of scholarship on the politics
of regulation that seeks “integration and coherence” by “build[ing] in a systematic way on what we already know”
(Moe 1985, p. 1095). By assembling and systematizing the core of what we know, this article provides the scaffolding on which to build.
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Endnote
1

The terms “regulatory outcomes” or “compliance and enforcement outcomes” are used to refer to the dependent variables
in the empirical studies reviewed, including, most commonly: enforcement rigor, enforcement targeting, enforcement style,
and compliance with rules. While not all of these dependent variables measure the ultimate outcomes of regulation—
meaning the actual performance of regulation in mitigating harms—they represent compliance and enforcement outcomes
relevant to harm reduction that commonly are measured in the literature. These dependent variables are not coded separately in the analysis because the focus of this article is on the operationalization of independent political variables.
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Appendix A: Summary of qualitative studies
Constructs

Measures/Studies

Elected Ofﬁcials
Party afﬁliation of political principals

Conservative party afﬁliation of local elected council
Hutter 1989
Political party in power
Almond & Esbester 2018

Support of political principals

Perceptions of local government support for enforcement
Lo & Fryxell 2005
Lo et al. 2006
Tilt 2007
Van Rooij et al. 2013
Policy emphasis of local politicians
May & Winter 2009
Opposition to enforcement by local governments
Tilt 2007
Van Rooij 2010
Environmental reputation of local governments; funding for
local Environmental Protection Bureaus
Van Rooij & Lo 2010
Support of local politicians
Haines 2011

Political pressure

Intervention in agency decisions by members of Congress,
political appointees
Mills & Koliba 2015

Structure of Government Institutions
Agency resources

Budget and staff
Hutter 1986, 1989
Lo & Leung 2000
McAllister 2008
Haines 2011
Mills & Koliba 2015
Perceptions of resource adequacy
Lo et al. 2006
Number and education of enforcement staff of local Environmental
Protection Bureau; material resources
Van Rooij & Lo 2010
Extent of privatization
Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock 2013
Material and information resources
Amengual 2014, 2016

Support for enforcement in bureaucratic
hierarchy

Targeted enforcement campaigns by national regulator
Van Rooij 2006
Van Rooij & Lo 2010
Instructions from bureaucratic supervisors to restrain enforcement
Waller 2007
Negative reaction by bureaucratic superiors
Mascini & Van Wijk 2009
(Continues)
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Constructs

Measures/Studies

Autonomy

Number of high-level agency positions ﬁlled by the executive through
appointment process
McAllister 2008
Constitutional protections for prosecutors + state budget and
appointment process
McAllister 2008
Environmental agencies subject to control by other agencies
McAllister 2008
Civil service protections and training requirements
Pires 2008
Job security of ofﬁcials, control by other agencies
McAllister 2010
Regulators insulated from industry inﬂuence
Coslovsky & Locke 2013
Afﬁrmative action ofﬁcers insulated from administration ofﬁcials
Edelman et al. 1991

Procedural constraints on regulators

Judicial review
Verweij 2000
Waller 2007
Van Rooij 2010
Institutional channels for citizen complaints
Lo & Leung 2000
Public participation requirements
Hutter 2001
Costly procedures
Van Rooij 2010
Congressional rules and statutory constraints on regulators
Eisner 2017

Agency reputation

Agency capacity + agency support networks
Carpenter 2010

Interest Groups
Labor

Activist union representatives at supplier factories
Bartley & Egels-Zandén 2015

Lobbying

Lobbying by issue-oriented interest groups
Bardach & Kagan 1982
Hood et al. 2001

NGO pressure

NGO pressure on industry
Kagan et al. 2003
Gunningham et al. 2004a, 2004b
Activist pressure on brands to adhere to labor standards
Bartley 2005
Rodríguez-Garavito 2005
Regulator perceptions of interest group support
Lo et al. 2006
Reported NGO inﬂuence on compliance with food safety regulation
Hutter & Jones 2007
Advocacy networks with union representatives
Bartley & Egels-Zandén 2015
(Continues)
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Constructs

Measures/Studies

Community activism

Community support for or resistance to local industry
Kagan et al. 2003
Gunningham et al. 2004a, 2004b
Resistance by local stakeholders
Van Rooij 2006
Citizen complaints to regulators
Tilt 2007
Van Rooij 2010
Van Rooij & Lo 2010
Demonstrations, lawsuits, media attention
Van Rooij 2010
Van Rooij & Lo 2010

Media

Regulator perceptions of media support
Lo et al. 2006
Publicity about food hygiene practices
Hutter & Jones 2007
Exposés about pollution enforcement
Tilt 2007
Investigations by local reporters; national media reports of local injustices
Van Rooij 2010

Industry

Retaliation against or buyouts of activists
Van Rooij 2010
Acts of evasion
Van Rooij & Lo 2010
Political clout of industry
Coslovsky & Locke 2013

State-civil society linkages

Extent of linkages between agency and pro-enforcement organizations
Amengual 2014, 2016
Extent of support in unions and government agencies for
joint enforcement projects
Amengual & Fine 2016

Support of interested constituencies

Interest groups demanding public regulation vs. interest groups
demanding private regulation
Amengual 2010

Barriers to collective action

Dependency on local ﬁrm; lack of education, experience
Van Rooij 2010

Corruption

Public reports of corruption
McAllister 2008
Reputation for corruption
McAllister 2010

Economic Context
Employment

Unemployment rate
Hutter & Manning 1990

GDP

Per capita GDP
Van Rooij & Lo 2010
(Continues)
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Constructs

Measures/Studies

Local economic conditions: employer viability

Resource levels of regulated ﬁrms
Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock 1992
State of regulated industry and local economy
Hutter 1997
Solvency of important employers
Tilt 2007

Local economic dependencies

Firm market dominance
Van Rooij 2006
Van Rooij & Lo 2010

Public Opinion
Public awareness and concern about regulatory
problems

Media attention to risks, accidents
Bardach & Kagan 1982
Hutter 1989, 1997, 2001, 2011
Hood et al. 2001
Haines 2011
Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock 2013
Almond & Esbester 2016
Public criticism of regulators
Hawkins 1984
Visibility and severity of accidents
Hutter 1986
Gunningham 1987
Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock 1990, 1992
Information campaign by regulator to educate public
Lo & Leung 2000
Public opinion polls
Hood et al. 2001
Consumer concern about food safety
Hutter & Jones 2007

Anti-regulation sentiment

Anti-regulation media coverage
Hutter & Manning 1990

Societal support for enforcement

Survey responses re: support for environmental enforcement
Lo & Fryxell 2005
Van Rooij et al. 2013
Afﬁrmative action ofﬁcers’ perceived community support for strict
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws
Edelman et al. 1991

Perceived legitimacy of regulators

Consensus about moral culpability of regulatory violations
Parker 2006
Consensus about environmental concerns embodied in national
regulation
Van Rooij 2006
Perception of harm reduction
Haines 2011

Agency reputation

Stakeholder beliefs about agency’s efﬁcacy in pursuing its mandate
Gilad & Yogev 2012
Etienne 2015
Carpenter 2010
(Continues)
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Measures/Studies

Political Culture
Ideology

Anti-regulation scholarship
Hutter & Manning 1990
Differences in national normative orders
Verweij 2000
Capitalist and neoliberal ideologies
Gray 2006, 2009
Balaton-Chrimes & Haines 2015, 2016
Anti-regulatory statements by political leaders
Almond & Esbester 2016, 2018

National political culture

Corporatism vs. pluralism
Verweij 2000
National regulatory styles
Kagan & Axelrad 2000
Cultural acceptance of criminalization
Almond 2015

Inequality

Extreme inequality between developers and those contesting
development projects
Balaton-Chrimes & Haines 2016

Political polarization

Polarization metrics
Eisner 2017

Cultural scripts: “Regulatory myths”

Media stories of frivolous regulation
Almond 2009

Sub-Politics
Dialogue and negotiation with stakeholders

Observational data
Coslovsky 2009
Coslovsky et al. 2011
Huising & Silbey 2011
Haines 2011
Pires 2011

Individual Politics
Political views of implementing bureaucrats

Observational data
Lipsky 1980
Edelman et al. 1991
Lo et al. 2006
May & Winter 2009
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Appendix B: Summary of quantitative studies
Constructs

Measures/Studies

Elected Ofﬁcials
Party afﬁliation of political principals

Party of the president
Moe 1982, 1985
Scholz et al. 1991
Carpenter 2002
Shrock 2013
Party of congressional representatives
Scholz et al. 1991
Carpenter 2002
Innes & Mitra 2015
Majority party in state legislature
Scholz & Wei 1986
Scholz et al. 1991
Keiser & Soss 1998
Shrock 2013
Party of state governor
Scholz & Wei 1986
Shrock 2013
Party of local representatives
Scholz et al. 1991
Left party control of legislature
Mosely 2008
Left party chief executive
Ronconi 2012
Powerful left-wing political parties
Berliner et al. 2015

Party afﬁliation of local population

Democratic vote share
Huber 2007

Ideology of political principals

Congressional ideology scores
Weingast & Moran 1983
Moe 1985
Scholz & Wei 1986
Kim 2008
Delmas & Toffel 2008
Shrock 2013
State legislature ideology scores
Kim 2008
Conservatism of congressional delegation, members of
relevant subcommittees
Huber 2007

Congressional oversight

Local representative on relevant oversight committee
Kleit et al. 1998
Helland 1998
Budgeting
Wood 1988
Wood & Waterman 1991
Carpenter 1996
(Continues)
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Constructs

Measures/Studies

Constituency of political principal

Voter demographics
Holland 2015, 2017

Structure of Government Institutions
Agency enforcement resource levels

Agency budget
Keiser & Soss 1998
Shimshack 2014
Jackson & Zhang 2016
Agency staff
Ronconi 2010
“Reinvented” status of ﬁeld ofﬁce
Huber 2007

Agency enforcement resource slack

“Reinvented” status of ﬁeld ofﬁce
Huber 2007

Political appointments

Presidential selection of agency leader
Wood 1988
Wood & Waterman 1991

Executive control

Centralized decision-making processes
Wood & Waterman 1991

Agency independence

Executive vs. independent department
Wood & Waterman 1991

Government level

State/federal/regional
Magat & Viscusi 1990
Scholz et al. 1991
Gray & Shadbegian 2004
Earnhart 2004
Deily & Gray 2007
Morantz 2009

Procedural constraints on regulators

Number of veto players
Mosely 2008

Electoral rules

Electoral rules allowing poor voters to elect local politicians
Holland 2015, 2017

Interest Groups
Labor

Strike activity
Moe 1985
Unionization
Weil 1991
Brown 1995
Gray & Mendeloff 2005
Morantz 2011, 2013
Unionization rates and linkages with political leaders
Mosely 2008
Worker complaints ﬁled with agency
Scholz & Wei 1986
Brown 1995
Huber 2007
(Continues)
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Measures/Studies
Union afﬁliation of worker complainants
Huber 2007
High rates of union membership
Berliner et al. 2015

Lobbying capacity

Wealth and number of interested organizations
Carpenter 2002
Number of registered lobbyists in jurisdiction
Cebula et al. 2014

Media

High levels of press freedom in supplier countries
Toffel et al. 2015
Media coverage of regulatory issue
Carpenter 2002
Kim 2008

Consumer social conscience

Index measuring consumer concern about sustainability issues
Toffel et al. 2015

Community collective action potential

Voter turnout
Hamilton 1993
Membership in environmental NGOs
Delmas & Toffel 2008
Interaction of voter turnout and NGO membership
Gray & Shadbegian 2004
State anti-SLAPP legislation
Ashenmiller & Norman 2011

Community political power

Population size
Earnhart 2004
Education
Earnhart 2004
Percent below poverty line
Hamilton 1993
Gray & Shadbegian 2004
Percent nonwhite
Hamilton 1993
Gray & Shadbegian 2004

Community political orientation

Percent Republican
Earnhart 2004
Index measuring community support for a political party over time
Scholz et al. 1991

Costs of Enforcement
Employment

Unemployment rate
Moe 1985
Deily & Gray 1991
Huber 2007
Mosely 2008

Inﬂation

Inﬂation rate
Moe 1985

Employer viability

Probability of plant closing
Deily & Gray 1991
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Constructs

Measures/Studies

Employer market dominance

Plant employment ratio to local labor market
Deily & Gray 1991

Trade policy

Ratio of imports + exports to GDP
Ronconi 2012

Beneﬁts of Enforcement
Health beneﬁts

Ambient air quality
Earnhart 2004

Property value

Home ownership rates
Hamilton 1993
Home values
Hamilton 1993

Damage avoidance

Facility pollution level
Earnhart 2004
Size of affected population
Earnhart 2004
Damage valuation (per capita income of affected population)
Earnhart 2004
Baseline ambient environmental quality
Earnhart 2004
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